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Abstract 
Territorial power sharing is often used to diminish aspirations of independence among self-
determination movements. The academic literature shows various perspectives on the 
effectiveness of territorial power sharing. It is often mentioned that territorial power sharing 
would have a short term stabilising effect, though aspirations of independence would revive on 
the long-term. This notion is examined through a discourse analysis combined with a content 
analysis in a case study of Northern Ireland and its self-determination movements. The research 
shows that the discourse on independence keeps decreasing over time. However, it seems like 
the struggle has been taken into the political arena, where a long-term plan for independence is 
evolving.  
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Introduction 
Ethnic conflicts on independence are an often returning concept in International Relations. Most 
of these are settled with a form of territorial power sharing (herein after TPS). One can think of 
cases in Indonesia (Trzciński, 2017), Ethiopia and Nepal (Butenshøn, Stiansen & Vollan, 2015). 
When a settlement like this is implemented so often, one would expect it to be successful. On 
first sight it seems to resolve a zero-sum game; the self-determination movement receives some 
power to rule itself, though still within the territory of the state. However, when both sides of 
the conflict have given their lives for independence or to prevent it, is TPS enough to settle 
these aims?  
The case study in this thesis is used by some as the success story of TPS: the Good Friday 
Agreement in Northern Ireland (Wolff, 2009, p.28). During the Troubles, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) fought a vicious war against the British government and the Unionists 
for independence and reunification with the Republic of Ireland. The use of bombing 
campaigns, assassinations and paramilitaries, led to the estimated number of “4000 deaths and 
over 40,000 injuries” during the Troubles (Fay, Morrissey & Smyth, 1999, p.121). 
The conflict was settled through the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which included power 
sharing between the Unionists and Nationalists in Northern Ireland and devolution under the 
British government. However, the success story shows some cracks. In some neighbourhoods 
splinter paramilitary organisations are still present (NOS, 22/05/2018), the Northern Ireland 
Assembly has not met for a year-and-a-half due to disagreement on e.g. the Irish Language Act 
(BBC, 05/02/2018) and the quote of the mural “prepared for peace, ready for war” (The Irish 
News, 15/10/2016) is often recalled. 
Looking at the academic debate, it is often mentioned that TPS is a short term solution, resulting 
in the revival of the struggle for independence in the long term (Coronel Ferrer, 2012; 
Kymlicka, 1998; Bertrand, 2014). On the other hand, the main tendency in the Northern Irish 
society seems to be that it needs time to heal and generations to pass, before the legacies of the 
conflict have settled (Field Work1, 31/05-03/06/2018).  
 
                                                          
1 I visited Belfast in Northern Ireland for a better understanding of the conflict and the implementation of 
territorial power sharing. My observations in Northern Ireland used in this research are referred to as ‘Field 
Work’. 
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This leads to the following research question:  
Does territorial power sharing, as the outcome of an ethnic conflict, lead to decreasing 
aspirations of independence among self-determination movements over time? 
This will be examined by an intertemporal co-variational analysis on TPS in Northern Ireland. 
By combining a discourse analysis and content analysis on the discourse of the PIRA and the 
Nationalist party Sinn Féin, it will be examined if TPS has decreased their aspirations of 
independence over time. By including a time dimension, this research will contribute to the 
empirical gap in the existing academic literature on the longevity of TPS.  
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Territorial power sharing (TPS) 
TPS means distributing certain powers or an exclusive status from the national government to 
a specific region (Weller, 2008, p.14). After an ethnic conflict over secessionism, TPS seems 
like a solution to create a positive sum game for both parties. The state’s sovereign territorial 
integrity is preserved, while the self-determination movement gains more power to govern 
itself. It could be an appropriate solution for a state clashing with ethnic minorities. Most states 
consist of a majority group co-existing with one or multiple ethnic minorities. This structure 
often leads to tensions between the groups and results in (non-)deliberate discrimination or 
disadvantaging of the ethnic minority, causing unrest within the state. A solution can be 
allocating power from the central government to the ethnic minority. This can be achieved by 
various forms of TPS (Benedikter, 2009, p.5-6). 
The various forms of TPS can be categorised in “[federalism], autonomy, devolution and 
decentralisation” (Wolff, 2009, p.32). Though all forms involve some sort of power 
distribution, the relation towards the central government can differ. A federal entity is generally 
involved in central policy making, while an autonomic region receives its power through a local 
political institution. A variation within federalism (among others) can also be observed in 
symmetry and asymmetry. Symmetrical federalism means that all federal regions have received 
the same level of power on similar issues. In an asymmetrical federal system a discrepancy 
exists in the level and type of power between the various federal regions. Examples of the 
granting of federalism after ethnic tensions can be observed in Belgium, Malaysia and Nigeria.  
As mentioned before, autonomous regions usually do not have any special powers within the 
central government, but receive power within their own region. Autonomous regions have 
legislative and executive powers and are special regions within the state with more and far-
reaching powers than other regions. An example is the first autonomous region in Europe, 
Aland (Finland). An autonomous region is usually characterised by a democratic institution 
where authorized issues are governed. However, some issues remain under the mandate of the 
national government, like national security and international matters (Benedikter, 2009, p.5-
12).  
Decentralisation entails that the national government allocates some administrative powers to 
a region or multiple regions. However, legislative and executive powers are withheld and 
matters of decentralisation do not require constitutional change. Decentralisation is perceived 
as the minimum form of TPS (Benedikter, 2009, p.11).  
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An overall note for all forms of TPS, is that structures can be adjusted to a specific situation. 
This flexibility results in the fact that structures of TPS differ from case to case, also within the 
same category. An important example of this is devolution. Devolution is the British variation 
of autonomy, in which the British central government has allocated power and resources to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Because of the examination of the case of Northern 
Ireland in this research, further attention will be given to devolution.  
All three regions have received devolved powers by the establishment of local executive and 
legislative institutions. The democratic bodies are elected through local elections, while the 
local electorate still votes for the national government. Governing issues are categorised in: 
excepted, reserved and transferred matters. Transferred matters are the issues devolved to the 
sub-government, this can be anything other than the reserved and excepted issues, for example 
education, the health system and agriculture. Excepted matters maintain under the rule of the 
central government and can differ depending on the extent of devolution, but mostly entail 
defence and international affairs. Reserved matters are in the power of the central government 
at the moment, but might be devolved in the future. In Northern Ireland these are sensitive cases 
like policing and the judicial system (McEvoy, 2008, p.158). Devolution is implemented to 
maintain the characteristics of the region and to bring politics closer to the British citizens. It is 
adjusted to the specific region, therefore, the particular structure and origins of devolution in 
Northern Ireland will be explained to further extent later.  
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Theories on territorial power sharing  
Noticeable, is the divide in the literature on the effectiveness of TPS. This divide will be 
demonstrated below by analysing the existing literature.  
Closer to secessionism 
Many argue that TPS is a step closer to secessionism (Cornell, 2002; Kymlicka, 1998; Brancati, 
2006). This argument is mainly divided into two positions: the strengthening of the local 
identity and granting the resources needed for secessionism  
Strengthening identity 
Some argue that by granting special powers to a certain region, the central government 
acknowledges the importance and the exclusivity of that region. This leads to the strengthening 
of the regional identity (Kymlicka, 1998). Brancati emphasises the role of regional parties in 
this identity building. The emergence of regional parties as a consequence of TPS is also a 
contributing factor to the increasingly strong regional identity. Depending on the political 
system, regional parties are likely to be elected when TPS is implemented, because of their 
closeness to the region and the regional ideas. However, these regional parties are more likely 
to introduce discriminatory policies and are able to mobilise the population towards 
independence. Additionally, TPS confirms and legitimises the exclusiveness of the group 
(Brancati, 2006, p.651-657). Depending on the TPS system, it can also institutionalise 
sectarianism, as might be the case in Northern Ireland. By incorporating the different groups in 
society at the governmental level, divides are institutionalised, maintained and will trickle down 
to the electorate. If self-determination movements are included in similar fashion, their ethnic 
divides are maintained, as are their aspirations (Deacon, 2012, p.171). 
Resources and experience  
By granting power and limited forms of self-determination through TPS, self-determination 
groups could obtain the recourses to achieve secessionism. By including the groups in 
governing or providing separate political institutions, political tools and experience are 
allocated to the groups and can be used to advance their goals. Self-determination groups 
receive the opportunity to mobilise their supporters towards their secessionist aspirations 
(Lustic, Miodownik & Eidelson, 2004, p.210). Kymlicka argues that by granting the tools and 
the experience of self-governance to the sub-government, the confidence in self-governing is 
built, making the step towards secessionism smaller. Often, sub-governments are able to create 
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their own revenue through taxes, have their own police forces and have legal institutions to 
reach the public. Additionally, Kymlicka claims that, even though the distribution of power is 
a top-down process, self-determination movements perceive TPS as granting power to the 
central government while maintaining a degree of self-determination. Often, the central 
government is perceived as illegitimate, therefore, demanding the power back would not be 
illegal. Thus, the more power distributed to the sub-government, the more this conviction is 
strengthened and the more the demands increase. Not having the right to self-determination 
seems like a limitation of their sovereignty (Kymlicka, 1998, p.138-141). 
Therefore, it is argued that because of the strengthening of the regional identity and the 
availability of resources and governmental experience, TPS is a step closer to secessionism.  
Closer to peace 
Others argue that TPS, when implemented well, can be a step closer to stability and peace and 
is able to prevent secessionism. 
 Self-determination 
TPS brings the government closer to the electorate by creating local governmental bodies, 
resulting in a more accurate representation of the region’s aspirations and providing 
opportunities to participate in political affairs. The main argument is, that by granting central 
power to the region, the region will be able to decide on some of their own social, economic 
and political matters. This results in a greater feeling of self-determination and better fitting 
policies. Additionally, by bringing politics closer to the people, trust in the government is more 
likely to develop. All this should result in decreasing aspirations of secessionism (Brancati, 
2006, p.655). Besides, TPS is a flexible solution to self-determination groups. Due to its 
flexibility, the agreement can adapt to the necessities in the region, providing a suitable solution 
for the specific situation and ethnic groups (Cornell, 2002, p.252). 
Institutionalising opposition 
Power sharing includes the minority in political decision making and therefore curbs ethnic 
conflict, according to Lijphart and Cohen (Cohen, 1997; Lijphart, 2008). A difference is made 
between majoritarian rule and non-majoritarian rule. Majoritarianism favours the majority in a 
democracy and excludes minorities. An example of this is the first-past-the-post system in the 
United Kingdom (UK). However, this can be problematic in the maintenance of minority rights, 
which can be subjected to the ‘tyranny’ of the majority (Lijphart, 2008, p.6-16). When (ethnic) 
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minorities are not able to secure their rights through political institutions, the result might be 
demonstrations, riots and conflict (Fuh-Sheng Hsieh, 2013, p.89), possibly leading to 
aspirations of secessionism. To prevent this, non-majoritarian rule (system of proportional 
representation) should be implemented according to Lijphart. This should preferably be a 
consociational democracy or a consensus democracy, which are forms of power sharing in 
which most minorities are included at the governmental level (Lijphart, 2008, p.6-16). This 
lowers the threshold to be represented in politics and increases the opportunities to participate 
in politics.  
As mentioned earlier, some argue that TPS affirms the differences in society. However, Cohen 
argues that federalism and autonomy acknowledge the existence of divisions in society and 
make them visible and manageable. Instead of suppressing the claims by the ethnic groups, a 
moderate, institutionalised outlet for challenging the status quo is created. This leads to more 
moderate measures instead of extreme measures like secessionism. By not providing 
opportunities for ethnic groups to challenge the status quo, few methods are available to 
pressure the government in a peaceful and legal way (Cohen, 1997, p.609-614). Even though 
an increase of conflicts in politics would occur due to opposing ideologies when TPS is 
implemented, the conflicts are non-violent and institutionalised (Cohen, 1997, p. 624).  
Thus, it is argued that by granting power to regional groups through democratic institutions, 
politics is more accessible to ethnic minorities and a legal outlet is created to express discontent 
and to challenge the status quo. 
Time dimension 
Scholars bring more nuance in the debate on the effectiveness of TPS by arguing that TPS has 
only a short term stabilising effect on an ethnic conflict (Coronel Ferrer, 2012; Kymlicka, 1998; 
Bertrand, 2014). However, again, a difference in perception is present. 
Kymlicka for example clearly states that “In general, it seems to me unlikely that federalism 
can provide an enduring solution to the challenges of ethnocultural pluralism. It may restrain 
these challenges for a period of time, but federal systems which are designed to accommodate 
self-governing ethnocultural groups are likely to be plagued by deadlock and instability” 
(Kymlicka, 1998, p.112-113). TPS might not be enough to address the issues that lead to the 
aspirations of secessionism. The short term could provide a feeling of change, but time will 
show that core issues have not changed, heating up secessionist aspirations (Betrand, 2014, 
p.177). 
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It is also argued that because TPS is such a complex solution in which commitment and proper 
implementation is key, it is hard to actually operationalise functional TPS. During the 
negotiations and shortly after, TPS might seem a fitting solution, however, it could lead to 
disappointing results in the long-term (Ghai, 2000, p.10). Additionally, as has been argued 
above, the emerging regional parties as a result of TPS can play a role in mobilizing the 
population and intensifying the regional identity. However, this can be a graduate, long-term 
process. One should not only think about the resources granted for campaigning and media to 
raise the regional voice. Policies, like a specific educational system, can also play a role in this 
(Cornell, 2002, p.255). As these policy changes take time to implement, the effect will be 
gradual and on the long term. This confirms the idea that TPS is effective on the short term, but 
secessionist aspirations will rise on the long term. 
Though, interesting to note, Barter mentions that there are very few cases in which meaningful 
autonomy has led to actual secessionism (Barter, 2018, p.300). The arguments made on 
bringing politics closer to the population and institutionalising minorities, have a positive stance 
on the long term effect of TPS. When following the argumentation of Cohen and Lijphart 
(Cohen, 1997; Lijphart 2008), the institutionalisation of opportunities to challenge the status 
quo results in the existence of a long-term outlet for discontent. Instead of having to reach for 
illegal and unconventional measures, TPS offers a long-term solution. Changing governmental 
policies does not require violence or secessionism anymore. 
Rothchild and Hartzell have refined a timeframe of five years to measure the stability of a peace 
agreement that includes TPS, based on the idea that in these five years the first election after 
the conflict has taken place. If a country is still stable and peaceful afterwards, it has reached a 
milestone and stability is likely to endure (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1999, p.262). The conclusion 
of the research is that including territorial autonomy in the peace agreement contributes to a 
stable post-conflict situation in the five years after (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1999, p.268). 
Rothchild and Hartzell, therefore, assume that the stability of TPS moves in an upward linear 
line, which continues after the first ‘successful’ five years.  
Again, various perspectives are notable in the existing literature. However, little empirical 
research has been done to confirm or contradict the statement of the longevity of TPS. Most 
researches mention the topic, mainly to underscore its short term effect, but do not examine the 
statement in further detail. This research will function as an addition to the academic debate, 
by researching one of the basic assumptions of TPS. 
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Background: The Troubles 
Northern Ireland is chosen as a case study for this research, since the peace agreement (officially 
‘The Belfast Agreement’, but mainly known as ‘The Good Friday Agreement’) implemented 
TPS as the result of an ethnic sectarian conflict over territory. It is a conflict of Nationalists 
against Unionists and the British government, in which the Nationalists have the goal to 
separate Northern Ireland from the UK and unite with the Republic of Ireland. Unionists on the 
other hand, strongly support the maintenance of the union of the UK and reject an unification 
with the Republic of Ireland. Various names and categorisations exist for both parties in the 
conflict, however, since most distinctions are not clear cut and are not the main focus of this 
research, the distinction is made on their aspirations regarding the Northern Irish territory: 
Unionists and Nationalists. Nationalists were mainly Catholic with republican aspirations and 
Unionists were mainly Protestants who were loyal to the British Crown (UCDP1, n.d.).  
To further develop this research, background information on the case of Northern Ireland is 
important to include.  
Origins of the Troubles 
The origins of the conflict go back to the 1600s, when the UK had imperialist aspirations 
towards Ireland. This materialised in the Act of the Union in 1800, in which Ireland became 
part of the UK (UCDP1, n.d.). The Act of the Union united Ireland and the UK and created a 
common government in the British Westminster parliament (Dickinson, 2005, p.57-63). 
Resistance arose on the Irish side, with its peak in 1916 with the Easter Risings in which 
protestors took up arms to contest the British government. These protestors became the 
predecessors of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This resistance resulted in the Anglo-Irish 
war from 1919-1921 between the British Army and the IRA. The IRA perceived the British 
rule as colonial and illegitimate. The use of violence was glorified and dying for Irish 
independence was associated with martyrdom (Maillot, 2005).  
At this point in time, Sinn Féin became a popular party and was elected for parliament in 1918. 
It refused to enter Westminster and therefore to acknowledge the UK as a legitimate ruler. The 
Anglo-Irish war ended with the independence of Ireland and Home Rule was implemented in 
Northern-Ireland. Home Rule is a form of devolution, where a local parliament is established 
to govern some devolved matters. In this solution Northern Ireland was still part of the UK, but 
was able to rule itself to a certain extent through received devolved powers (Fay, Morrissey & 
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Smyth, 1999, p.51). Northern Ireland remained part of the UK, since four out of the six counties 
in Northern Ireland contained a Protestant or Unionist majority (Dixon, 2001, p.4). Though, 
some (mainly Nationalists) argue that this was manipulated by gerrymandering (An Phoblacht, 
02/09/2012).  
Many Nationalists still aspired to be part of Ireland and believed they were unjustly part of the 
UK, which caused a feeling of threat among the Unionists (Tonge, 2002, para. 2.1). Again, the 
majority of the Northern Irish population is Protestant or Unionist. Since the electoral system 
was based on the general British first-past-the-post system, the majority of the population was 
favoured. Together with the electoral borders of the counties, this resulted in Unionist 
dominated governments (Fay, et al., 1999, p.53).  
The Catholics and Nationalists felt discriminated and supressed in Northern Ireland. One of the 
reasons was the Special Powers Act, implemented from 1922-1972 because of unrest and 
violence after the Anglo-Irish war and was endorsed by the British government. It was initially 
used to create order and peace in the province, but evolved in an instrument that enabled the 
Northern Irish government to supress the minority (Donohue, 1998, p.1090-1091). The mandate 
of the Special Powers Act kept growing, including censorship and the ban on Irish flags, while 
Nationalists felt restricted and threatened in their human rights. The Act was mainly carried out 
by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (the Northern Irish police force), which consisted 
primarily of Unionist forces (Donohue, 1998, p.1102-1107).  
Economically, Northern Ireland became weaker than the rest of the UK, hitting the Catholics 
and Nationalists the hardest. This had a direct effect on electoral discrimination. Voting 
qualifications were based on one’s financial situation, in which only home owners could vote. 
Since housing was another discriminatory issue, Nationalists did not have a strong enough vote 
to bring about change in the Unionist government. Protestants were often favoured in housing, 
leaving the Catholics in poor living conditions. In addition to this, many Catholic Nationalists 
felt discriminated in employment and excluded from state services (Tonge, 2002, p.20-24). On 
top of perceived British imperialism came dissatisfaction and a feeling of being disadvantaged 
by the Northern Irish and British governments, leading to demonstrations for civil rights by 
Nationalists (Fay, et al., 1999, p.55-57).  
During 1968 and 1969 the Nationalists used civil rights marches as a way to reach their 
Nationalist goals in a peaceful manner. However, this generated a violent reaction among 
Unionists who perceived the demonstrations as a threat. They attacked the protesters with no 
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restrictions by the RUC. This created a violent downwards spiral, which can be perceived as 
the ‘official’ start of the Troubles. The Nationalist paramilitary, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) 
had violent counter-reactions, (again) creating a threat for the Unionists (Smithey, 2011, p.55-
61). 
Though, the origins of the conflict are perceived differently from the Unionist perspective. Key 
in the existence of unionism is the fear of domination and oppression by the Catholics, after 
migrated Protestants from the UK were killed on a large scale in Ireland in 1641 and with 
Catholics as the majority on the Irish island (Smithey, 2011, p.54). The Orange Order (a 
Protestant order) was crucial in mobilizing Unionists in opposing Home Rule in 1921 and 
during the Troubles (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p.35-36). Due to the violence previously used 
by the Nationalists and their aim to separate from the UK, Unionist paramilitaries were created 
(McEvoy, 2008, p.67). 
The Troubles 1968 – 1998  
The violence between the two groups heightened and the British Army was deployed in 
Northern-Ireland in 1969 to protect both communities. However, it did not take long for 
Nationalists to distrust the British Army, as the Army was perceived as an illegitimate army on 
Irish territory protecting the British Crown. The British government allowed the Northern Irish 
government to implement a quick internment policy without trial to curb the PIRA’s actions 
(Fay, Morrissey & Smyth, 1999, p.58-59). As a reaction, the Nationalists protested on the streets 
of Derry for their civil rights. Here, the British Army oppressed the demonstrations violently 
by shooting and killing 13 unarmed protesters in 1972, on the day known as Bloody Sunday. 
The heavy retaliation by the British Army and the actions by the Unionist paramilitaries served 
as legitimisation of the PIRA’s and Sinn Féin’s struggle and their actions were intensified. 
Homes were burnt on both sides, both paramilitaries conducted assassinations, civilians were 
bombed and distrust and hatred escalated.  
It was a conflict with retaliation tendencies. After Bloody Sunday came Bloody Friday, in which 
the PIRA exploded 21 bombs in the centre of Belfast. This retaliation continued throughout the 
conflict between the Nationalist paramilitaries, Unionist paramilitaries and the British Army 
(McEvoy, 2008, p.37-38). Mainly civilians became victim of the Troubles, leading to nearly 
4000 people killed in 30 years and many more injured and mentally affected (Fay, et al., 1999, 
p.121). 
 
20 
 
The Peace Process  
Political initiatives to solve the conflict were ongoing since the 1970s and onward, but had little 
impact on the situation. However, the 1990s show change in the willingness to negotiate a peace 
agreement, especially on the side of the Nationalists. This was mainly caused by Sinn Féin’s 
change from military tactics to political tactics. A peace agreement was perceived as a helpful 
phase towards independence. These efforts were supported by the PIRA’s ceasefire in 1994.  
After this, Sinn Féin was able to join the peace negotiations, until 1996, when the PIRA broke 
the ceasefire by a bombing in Canary Wharf. According to the PIRA the British government 
was not negotiating with the right intentions and the process was too slow. The negotiations 
were in a rod, since the government wanted to include Sinn Féin in the negotiations, but refused 
this when the PIRA was using violence. A solution emerged when the national elections in 1997 
resulted in a Labour government led by Tony Blair, functioning as a new start. It initiated new 
negotiations and urged the PIRA to abandon their violent tactics and Sinn Féin to confirm thei 
commitment to peaceful means. After the PIRA resumed its ceasefire in 1997, the peace 
negotiations were able to continue with Sein Féin (McEvoy, 2008, p.118). The eventual 
agreement was signed on 10 April 1998 and was called the Belfast Agreement or the Good 
Friday Agreement (BBC History, 2018). 
Territorial power sharing in the Good Friday Agreement 
Important to the Good Friday Agreement is that it includes a section declaring that it is legal to 
unite Northern Ireland with Ireland, if a majority votes in favour in a referendum. However, if 
there is no majority, Northern Ireland remains within the UK. This means that parties like Sinn 
Féin are free to pursue change in the territorial status of Northern Ireland, as long as peaceful 
tactics are used. Additionally, whatever the territorial status of Northern Ireland, all people will 
be free from discrimination and are allowed to identify themselves as British, Irish or both (The 
Belfast Agreement, 1998, Constitutional Issues).  
Due to the nature of the Northern Irish conflict (a conflict between ethnic groups and between 
an ethnic group and the government) two kinds of TPS are included in the Agreement. This led 
to the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly with elected members through a 
proportional representation single transferable vote system (PRSTV), that has legislative and 
executive authority on devolved matters. PRSTV favours minorities in the democracy, because 
of the proportional representation. Votes will be directly reflected in the seats of the Assembly. 
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The Assembly and its devolved matters address the Northern Ireland – UK relationship (The 
Belfast Agreement, 1998, Strand One, para. 2).  
The Assembly’s decisions are based on a cross community system, which addresses the 
Unionist-Nationalist relationship within Northern Ireland. A cross community basis means that 
decisions in the Assembly are made with parallel consent. Thus, an issue has to be agreed upon 
by 50% of the Assembly, including 50% of both the Unionist and Nationalist Members of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA). A cross community based decision can also be passed through a 
weighted majority (60%), with 40% of both groups in favour (Northern Ireland Assembly, 
2017). The purpose of cross community based decision making is to assure that no sectarian 
majority will be able to rule alone. Critics argue that cross community based decision making 
actually imposes sectarianism, institutionalising the divide between the Nationalists and 
Unionists in society (McEvoy, 2008; Tonge, 2002).  
The Good Friday Agreement also holds other arrangements, such as, the First and Deputy First 
Minister will represent the biggest and second biggest party and their nomination must be 
accepted based on a cross community vote. Additionally, the Secretary of State is responsible 
for the Northern Ireland Office in Westminster and functions as an intermediary between 
Northern Ireland and the central government. In the end, Westminster Parliament is still in 
control of the reserved and excepted matters concerning Northern Ireland. (The Belfast 
Agreement, 1998, Strand One, para.32-33). 
To manage the relationship between Ireland and Northern Ireland the North/South Council is 
established, “to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland […] 
on matters of mutual interest” (The Belfast Agreement, 1998, Strand Two, para.1). The aim is 
to create closer ties between Ireland and Northern Ireland through a legitimate body. 
Additionally, the British-Irish Council is established to coordinate the developments of the 
islands, find agreement on issues of mutual interest and improve the bilateral relationship (The 
Belfast Agreement, 1998, Strand Three, para.1-12). 
After the peace agreement 
To accept the Good Friday Agreement, a referendum was held in May 1998 in both Northern 
Ireland and Ireland, which resulted in a 71,1% yes vote in Northern Ireland and a 94,4% yes 
vote in Ireland. With this high turnout, a strong mandate was confirmed. The referendum was 
followed by the first election of the Northern Ireland Assembly one month later. However, the 
formation of the Assembly experienced issues concerning the weapons of the PIRA, due to the 
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ambiguous description of decommissioning in the peace agreement. After strong negotiations, 
the PIRA agreed to inspections and the Assembly was formed in 2000, consisting of both 
Nationalist (including Sinn Féin) and Unionist parties. Yet, Sinn Féin entering the Northern 
Ireland Assembly led to unrest within the party. While some agreed with the new political tactic, 
others felt betrayed by Sinn Féin’s recognition of the Good Friday Agreement. During the 
PIRA’s ceasefire a split emerged leading to the Real IRA (RIRA), which remains an official 
terrorist organisation (Tonge, 2002, p.190-196). 
The effect of the Agreement was explained by both Unionists and Nationalists, in similar but 
opposite ways. Nationalists in favour of the agreement argued that the Agreement led to an 
united Ireland. Unionists opposed to the agreement argued the same. On the other hand, 
Nationalists opposing the Agreement argued that the Agreement solidifies the union, while pro-
Agreement Unionists argued the same. Sinn Féin viewed the Good Friday Agreement as a 
temporary solution and a transitional stage to independence (Tonge, 2002, p.195-196). 
After the peace agreement violence has mostly been absent, which led to a situation of negative 
peace in Northern Ireland. Tensions between the two communities are still present, however, a 
resurrection seems unlikely, though not impossible. A famous mural “ready for peace, but 
prepared for war” seems fitting to the situation (The Irish News, 15/10/2016). Nonetheless, 
violence has vanished, paramilitaries are disarmed and the Northern Irish economy has 
improved (Mac Ginty, Muldoon & Ferguson, 2007, p.7). The PIRA was decommissioned in 
2005, followed by the Unionist paramilitary UVF in 2009. The level of British militarisation 
was decreased to 5000 soldiers in 2007, a substantial decline from 30.000 soldiers during the 
conflict (Rolston, 2013, p.143). The Good Friday Agreement has institutionalised the divide in 
Northern Ireland, taking away the struggle in society and moving it to the political arena 
(Tonge, 2002, p.198). 
At the moment, the Northern Ireland Assembly has not governed for almost a year-and-a-half. 
Many social issues are transformed into political, sectarian issues. Sinn Féin refuses to form a 
government with the biggest party DUP, if their demand for e.g. the Irish Language Act, which 
would make Irish an official langue in Northern Ireland, is not met. Over the years Sinn Féin 
has become the second biggest party in the Assembly, making their bargaining position stronger 
(BBC, 05/02/2018). When talking to inhabitants of Belfast and looking at legacies of the 
Troubles and the stability of the peace agreement, many are sceptical but see that in a far future 
when generations have passed, reconciliation might be possible. However, many are still scared 
and have the memories of the Troubles close to their hearts. Also the street art (that is regularly 
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renewed) in West Belfast shows lasting aspirations for a unification with Ireland (Field Work, 
02/06/2018).  
Extra attention will be given to the PIRA and Sinn Féin to create a better understanding of their 
existence and actions, since they are the main actors in this research. 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
The PIRA is one the biggest self-determination groups in the Northern Irish conflict. The 
origins of the PIRA go back to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that fought for Irish 
independence in the 1920s. However, dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Independence caused 
the group to remain active. The IRA mobilised the civil rights demonstrations in Northern 
Ireland at the end of the 1960s, in response to the discriminatory policies and the bad living 
conditions of the Catholics. Due to the earlier described violent reactions to the demonstrations, 
a split took place within the group leading to the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA). The goal of the PIRA was equal rights for Catholics and the unification with the 
Republic of Ireland (Punch, 2012, ix).  
In 1969, besides functioning as a paramilitary protecting its community, the PIRA believed that 
the only way they would reach their goal was through violent actions (Shanahan, 2008, p.1). 
As a result of the power imbalance when fighting the British Army, the PIRA used forms of 
irregular warfare. Bombings and assassinations were the main forms of operation, resulting in 
approximately 700 civilians and a 1000 soldiers killed by the PIRA (Council of Foreign 
Relations, 2005). The PIRA was included on the list of official terrorist organisations until they 
decommissioned after the Good Friday Agreement in 2005. After decommissioning they 
stopped existing, though some underground splinter groups might still be present (Council of 
Foreign Relations, 2006). The PIRA has been strongly connected with the political party Sinn 
Féin throughout the conflict, until Sinn Féin turned to peaceful means (Shanahan, 2008, p.1). 
Sinn Féin 
Sinn Féin (meaning ‘We Ourselves’ or ‘Ourselves Alone’) is a political party active in both the 
UK and Ireland. It has Nationalist aims, but is politically located at left republican ideologies. 
The party was established in 1905 by Arthur Griffith to provide passive resistance to the rule 
of the British in Ireland. However, this passiveness changed drastically during the Easter 
Risings with Eamon de Valera as political leader. He strived for an independent Ireland, which 
got him elected with 73 Irish seats in Westminster. Sinn Féin refused to accept these seats, 
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which would acknowledge Westminster as a legitimate ruler. Instead, De Valera started Sinn 
Féin’s lasting tradition of abstentionism and established the Irish parliament in Dublin, Dáil 
Éireann (Maillot, 2005).  
Several splits have taken place within the party of which the split in 1969 is most remarkable. 
It is similar to the IRA’s split, where Sinn Féin sides with the PIRA. A change occurred under 
the leadership of Gerry Adams when he adopted the ‘armalite and ballot box’ tactics in the 
1980s, in which politics and military are combined. He followed the political success of Bobby 
Sands, who was elected in Westminster but died for the cause of a hunger strike. Adams, 
together with Martin McGuiness, led the party into the peace process, resulting in the Good 
Friday Agreement. In the first Assembly elections, Sinn Féin received 18% of the seats in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and four seats in Westminster, the latter Sinn Féin keeps refusing 
up until today. A milestone was reached in 2007, when the DUP and Sinn Féin formed the 
Stormont government together for the first time. This brought Unionist paramilitary leader Ian 
Paisley and Nationalist paramilitary leader Martin McGuinness together as First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister (Britannica Online Academic Edition, 2018). 
The principles of the party during the Troubles were mainly focussed on equal rights and an 
unification with Ireland. While these principles are still present, the party has developed more 
conventional policies as well, enabling them to govern Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin, 2018).  
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Research design 
Though the literature on TPS varies between quantitative (Sambanis, Germann & Schädel, 
2017; Saideman & Ayres, 2000) and qualitative research (Bertrand, 2014; Kelegama, 2015), 
little in-depth research has been done on the time dimension within this concept. Therefore, this 
research will use an intertemporal co-variational analysis of the effect of TPS on the aspirations 
of independence. The benefit of a qualitative research in this case is the intensive and detailed 
research, which enables one to observe graduate developments. It allows the researcher to take 
the context of the phenomenon into account. A co-variational analysis is focused on the 
independent variable and its effect on the dependent variable. Important is the counterfactual 
understanding in the co-variational analysis, where the outcome would be different had the 
independent variable not taken place. However, because most cases in International Relations 
cannot be rerun with the absence of the independent variable, it can never be truly known if the 
outcome would have been different. This is one of the limitations and can be resolved to a 
certain extent by making comparisons between carefully selected cases (Blatter & Haverland, 
2012, p.33-37).  
Additionally, as the focus is centred on the effect of the independent variable, it is important to 
isolate this variable by using a most similar system design (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.37-
41). Instead of using a cross case comparison between similar cases, this research uses an 
intertemporal comparison within the case of Northern Ireland. A comparison will be made 
between the temporal cases of Northern Ireland before the implementation of TPS, Northern 
Ireland shortly after the agreement of TPS and Northern Ireland longer after the agreement of 
TPS. One of the benefits of using an intertemporal comparison of Northern Ireland, is that many 
variables are consistent and can be ruled out. This contributes to the isolation of the independent 
variable, though this can never be done to a full extent (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.46-47).  
Following the intertemporal co-variational analysis, the research question is: 
Does territorial power sharing, as the outcome of an ethnic conflict, lead to decreasing 
aspirations of independence among self-determination movements over time?  
Following the argumentation of Rothchild and Hartzell, TPS as having a continuing stabilising 
effect, the hypotheses are thought of in a similar but opposite fashion. Since it is argued that 
TPS only has a short-term stabilising effect (Coronel Ferrer, 2012; Kymlicka, 1998; Bertrand, 
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2014), it is expected that the aspirations of independence increase or at least do not decrease in 
the long term. 
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Territorial power sharing leads to decreasing aspirations of independence 
in the short term. 
Hypothesis 2: Territorial power sharing does not lead to decreasing aspirations of 
independence in the long term. 
Hypothesis 1 will be accepted when the research shows that the implementation of TPS has 
decreased the discourse on independence. One can think of a downward linear line. Hypothesis 
2 will be accepted if the discourse on independence stops decreasing or increases in the long 
term. One can think of a flat line or even an U-curve.  
Case selection 
To be able to draw conclusions from the outcome of the research, the cases selected must be 
representative for the other existing cases and the academic literature. In the case of TPS it is 
often mentioned that, to be implemented well, the political system must be fully democratic. 
Only in these cases TPS can be meaningful, since the central government grants powers to a 
sub-national government through democratic institutions (Benedikter, 2009, p.9). This limits 
the case selection in a substantial way, when following the data on the level of freedom and 
democracy by the Freedom House (Freedom House1, 2018). The second requirement is that 
TPS is agreed upon as a reaction to an ethnic conflict with secessionist aspirations. Again, this 
limits the case selection substantially as in most cases these violent ethnic conflicts do not take 
place in states with developed democracies.  
This has led to the decision to focus the research on the case of the ethnic conflict in Northern 
Ireland, which meets both requirements. According to the Freedom House, the UK has the 
freedom status of ‘free’ and is perceived as a state with a developed democracy (Freedom 
House2, 2018). Additionally, the conflict in Northern Ireland between Nationalists, Unionists 
and the British government of 1968-1998 is an ethnic conflict with secessionist aspirations 
(UCDP1, n.d.). Though it might be an exceptional case empirically, it meets the requirements 
of the literature. Since this research aims to falsify a theoretical claim, the focus of this research 
is placed on the case fitting the literature.  
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Independent variable  
In a co-variational analysis, the focus is on the independent variable. The main question is: 
‘does X have an effect on Y?’ (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.33-35). Since this research tries to 
examine the effect of TPS on the aspirations of independence, the independent variable is 
‘territorial power sharing, as the outcome of an ethnic conflict’. Since TPS is such a flexible 
policy, it can be implemented in violent and non-violent situations. However, the effect of X 
might be different in these situations. To be able to generalise and to compare, the violent and 
non-violent cases have to be distinguished and kept as a constant. Because the consequences of 
the implementation of TPS after a violent conflict are extremer, research on these cases is 
required. Therefore, this research focusses on the violent cases. The definition of the 
independent variable ‘TPS’ is based on Deacon’s very general definition of devolution. TPS is 
“the process of transferring power from the central government to a [territorial region through 
democratic institutions]” (Deacon, 2012, p.2).  
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable Y portrays the effect of X. The dependent variable applied in this 
research is the ‘aspirations of independence among self-determination movements’. These 
aspirations can be expressed both verbally and physically. This means that the degree of desire 
for independence can be expressed in the discourse of the self-determination movement, but 
also in the physical actions of the self-determination movement.  
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Operationalization 
Actors 
The two actors researched here are the Northern Irish regional party Sinn Féin and the PIRA. 
During the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, the PIRA was the actor physically fighting for 
independence from the UK and for a unification with Ireland. After the Good Friday 
Agreement, Sinn Féin entered the Northern Ireland Assembly to carry on the struggle in politics. 
Though Sinn Féin distances itself from the violence by the PIRA now, Sinn Féin was strongly 
connected to the PIRA during the Troubles (The Irish Times, 17/02/1998). For this reason Sinn 
Féin and the PIRA will be analysed as the self-determination movements. 
Timeframe 
Since time dimension plays a big role in this research, the timeframe has to be chosen carefully. 
The Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 and marks a divide of the cases of Northern 
Ireland before TPS and Northern Ireland after TPS. Some argue that the height of the conflict 
is situated in the 1970s with the major event of Bloody Sunday in 1972, also the most lethal 
year of the Troubles (Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999, p.137). Therefore, the year 1972 will be 
taken as the first point of measurement.  
Following the argument made by Rothchild and Hartzell (Rothchild & Hartzell, 1999, p.262), 
the second point of measurement will be within five years after the signing of the peace 
agreement and possibly before the first elections of the Northern Ireland Assembly, as it is 
assumed that this will be the moment all parties are pleased with the agreement. However, the 
first elections were held in 1998, the same year as the Good Friday Agreement, creating a time 
period too short to measure only before the elections. Thus the year 1998 is chosen for the 
second measurement.  
The last point of measurement will measure the aspirations of independence in the long term. 
For this reason, the furthest point in time should be chosen. However, this is limited by Brexit. 
Brexit has substantial implications for the peace agreement and the aspirations of independence 
in Northern Ireland, as it contests the Northern Ireland-Ireland border. Currently citizens of the 
Irish island were able to move freely over the island as a member of the European Union. 
However, this could be complicated after Brexit. Since Brexit is such a unique feature of the 
UK and too recent to examine, it will be excluded from this research. The referendum was 
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announced on 20 February 2016 (BBC, n.d.), so to exclude this influence the third point of 
measurement will be 2015. 
Methodology 
The main method of analysis is the discourse analysis. The discourse analysis will be used to 
analyse the use of language and its meaning by self-determination movements concerning 
independence and in this case the unification with the Republic of Ireland. A discourse analysis 
is the study of language, but this definition is too basic in explaining its purpose in this research. 
Johnstone explains: “discourses’ […] involve patterns of belief and habitual action as well as 
patterns of language. Discourses are ideas as well as ways of talking that influence and are 
influenced by the ideas” (Johnstone, 2002, p.3). The discourse analysis in this research will help 
to indicate to what extent independence and unification with Ireland are still an aspiration of 
the self-determination movements. It will show to what degree TPS has changed the self-
determination movement’s goals and the way they articulate this goal towards the public. A 
discourse analysis is helpful in the sense that it is not the objective study of language, but 
examines the meaning of the spoken, written or displayed language (Johnstone, 2002, p.3).  
Because a discourse analysis is still subject to the researcher’s interpretation, it will be 
supported by a content analysis. A content analysis is “an approach to the analysis of documents 
and texts, that seek to quantify content in terms of pre-determined categories” (Bryman, 2008, 
p.274). The content analysis will show the representativeness of the textual extracts and the 
author’s understanding of the discourse analysis and will therefore make the conclusion of the 
research stronger (Prior, 2014, p.10-12). 
Table 1 shows the sources used for the discourse analysis. The content analysis will also be 
carried out on the sources of the discourse analysis as a check-up, next to the separate content 
analysis of Sinn Féin’s statements in the Irish Times. The latter displays the line of discourse 
in a graph, making the increase or decrease in aspirations more visible. 
The sources for the discourse analysis are two sources by Sinn Féin and one source by the PIRA 
for every year, except for 1972 due to Sinn Féin’s abstentionism. Two sources are chosen for 
Sinn Féin concerning a different context and communicating to a different public. According 
to Risse and Sikkink, it is important that the same discourse is communicated to different 
publics, with regards to norm internalisation. Norm internalisation is appropriate here since a 
change of the discourse on the norm ‘independence’ is researched here. “Argumentative 
consistency independent of the audience” is key here (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p.29). This 
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however, was not possible for the PIRA, due to the inaccessibility of useful PIRA sources. This 
has been an obstacle in the research overall, combined with the scope of the research, since the 
PIRA was an illegal organisation and Sinn Féin was often linked to the PIRA. Therefore, the 
content analysis will only be done on the discourse of Sinn Féin in the Irish Times, a newspaper 
in which they often communicated their message.  
 
Table 1: Sources discourse analysis 
The categories created for the discourse analysis are based on existing literature regarding the 
ideology of the PIRA and Sinn Féin in the context of the Northern Irish separation of Britain. 
1972: Sinn Féin 
addressing parliament
(Abstentionism)
1972: Sinn Féin 
addressing the party
The Ard Fheis 1972, presidential speech
1972: PIRA addressing 
the public
PIRA member Joe Cahill at Sinn Féin rally
1998: Sinn Féin 
addressing parliament
The Northern Ireland Assembly, first debate, 1 July 1998
1998: Sinn Féin 
addressing the party
The Ard Fheis 1998, presidential speech
1998: PIRA 
addressing the public
PIRA statement on decommissioning
2015: Sinn Féin 
addressing parliament
Northern Ireland Assembly debate, 07 September 2015
2015: Sinn Féin 
addressing the party
The Ard Fheis 2015, presidential speech
2015: PIRA 
addressing the public
Eamonn Mallie meets ... Martin McGuinness (interview)
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The PIRA and Sinn Féin are strongly built upon a republican, anti-imperialist ideology. Irish 
distinctiveness is emphasised as is the Irish language. However, many joined the PIRA as a 
form of defence against the Unionist/Protestant paramilitaries and the British Army. The UK 
was perceived as an imperialist occupier which had illegitimate rule over Northern Ireland and 
ruled aggressively and oppressively (Malešević & Ó Dochartaigh, 2018, p.316-319). Even 
though the PIRA and Sinn Féin adopted different means (military and political), the objectives, 
especially in the twentieth century, were similar. (Whiting, 2016, p.541-542). Therefore, the 
following categories (Table 2) have been selected for the discourse and content analysis, based 
on the ideologies of the PIRA and Sinn Féin. Three categories of decreasing aspirations 
(‘Moderation’, ‘Acceptance British rule’ and ‘Relating to British identity’) have been added, 
enabling the discourse analysis to show a decrease in the strength of discourse on independence. 
 
Table 2: categories discourse analysis 
The categories used for the content analysis are similar to the categories used for the discourse 
analysis. However, since the discourse analysis has shown that the categories of moderation are 
not explicitly mentioned, these categories are removed. A decrease in the overall discourse on 
independence will show an increase of moderation.   
Categories Independence & united Ireland 
Imperialism & repression (by the British government)
Relating to other similar struggles
Reference to historical Irish struggle against the British
Promotion & use of the Irish language
Moderation
Acceptance British rule
Relating to British identity
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Discourse analysis 1972 
Some context of the year 1972 is needed to understand the analysed discourses. In 1972 the 
main Nationalist and Catholic struggle was focussed on civil rights and the improvement of 
living conditions. However, violence had already erupted and both the Nationalists and 
Unionists had established their (defence) paramilitaries, while the British Army had settled in 
Northern Ireland. Internment without trial had been implemented in 1971 by the Northern Irish 
government in cooperation with the British government and led to poor conditions in prisons 
and ill treatment of prisoners (allegedly torture) (Ruane & Todd, 1996, p.129-131). After the 
resignation of the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, the British implemented Direct Rule in 
Northern Ireland in 1972, with Whitelaw as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. (Dixon, 
2001, p.118-121). Civil rights movements were still pursuing their goals through marches and 
peaceful demonstrations, however, the PIRA had also adopted its violent campaign. The PIRA 
felt positive about a possible victory and marked 1972 as the ‘Year of Victory’(McEvoy, 2008, 
p.38).  
Bloody Sunday took place on 30 January 1972, which is still remembered by the Nationalists 
as proof of the aggression of the British Army and its siding with the Unionist side (McEvoy, 
2008, p.38). 1972 was the most violent year of the Troubles with an estimated number of 497 
deaths, which is 13,8% of the victims of the Troubles (Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999, p.137). 
Though surprisingly, the PIRA initiated two ceasefires in March and June (Cowper-Coles, 
2012, p.225).  
The president of Provisional Sinn Féin, which has the main focus of this research, is Ruairi O 
Bradaigh. The president of Official Sinn Féin is Tomas MacGiolla. In 1972 the two parties were 
split, but not as strongly opposed to each other as later in the 1970s. The clear division between 
the two parties is the support of the armed struggle and abstentionism. A strong connection 
existed between the PIRA and the Provisional Sinn Féin, with the PIRA at the forefront in a 
military campaign and the support of Sinn Féin in publicity (Feeney, 2002, p.257-260). 
Provisional Sinn Féin abstained from the Northern Ireland Assembly and Westminster 
Parliament, thus a parliamentary discussion in 1972 cannot be analysed here. 
Presidential speech, Ard Fheis, 15-16 December 1972 
The Ard Fheis is the annual meeting of Sinn Féin where all fragments come together to discuss 
strategy and policy. The presidential speech is found in a copy of the Ard Fheis ’72 Report. 
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However, the document does not prescribe which president is speaking. It is expected, though 
not certain, that the president speaking here is MacGiolla, since the document indicates Sinn 
Féin’s participation in the general Irish elections. Goals of both parties are similar, including 
anti-imperialist goals and independence of Ireland, except on the cases of abstentionism and 
the use of military action in the North (Feeney, 2002, p.252).  
The strongest and most apparent discourse to be found in the document is on imperialism and 
British repression. It is made clear that British rule over Northern Ireland is a form of 
imperialism and raises anti-colonial sentiments. Sinn Féin rejects British rule in the North and 
connects this to the territorial struggle of independence and unification. The British Army is 
perceived as a foreign army occupying Northern Ireland. Emphasis is placed on the repression 
and aggression of the British Army and the British government against the Nationalist and 
Catholic Community:  
“To add to the reign of terror, special murder squads of the British Army were sent 
to the North to operate in civilian clothing” (Ard Fheis ’72, 1972, p.7). 
Not only is the issue of imperialism raised regarding the territorial struggle in Northern Ireland, 
but also regarding British imperial involvement in the Republic of Ireland and the Irish 
membership of the E.E.C.:  
“Even the most cursory analysis of the events of the past year will indicate it was a 
victorious year for British Imperialism in Ireland. It saw the imposition of Direct 
Rule under a one man dictatorship; a growth in sectarian organisations and a 
massive increase in sectarian bombings and murders; total harassment and 
terrorising of the population of the North; the Irish nation tied closer to Britain in 
the E.E.C.; fear and confusion spread amongst the people and fascism rampant, 
North and South” (Ard Fheis ’72, 1972, p.7). 
Overall, Sinn Féin rejects British rule and involvement in both the North, where Britain is 
perceived as a repressive and illegitimate occupant, and the South, where Britain maintains its 
colonial ties. 
This discourse is tied to the struggle of Sinn Féin to free Northern Ireland and unite it with the 
Republic. It is made clear that the present quest for a united Ireland moves beyond the objective 
of unification of North and South. All influences of the British on the Irish island should be 
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expelled and ownership of the Irish territory should be regained. Emphasis in the address is put 
on the re-conquest of Ireland and the anti-imperialist struggle: 
“Basically our objective can be stated to be the re-conquest of Ireland and our 
struggle is for the ownership and control of the wealth of Ireland by the mass of the 
Irish people. We are the only organisation pursuing this objective in its entirety” 
(Ard Fheis ’72, 1972, p.11). 
Also very persistent is the use of the Irish language. The first two pages of the presidential 
speech are in Irish. Unfortunately, due to the author’s lack of Irish language skills and the scope 
of the research, this cannot be translated. However, the substantial use of the language indicates 
a connection to the Irish heritage and differentiates Irish Sinn Féin from the British. It creates a 
feeling of unity, connecting only the people on the island of Ireland.  
Less apparent, though still present, is the reference to the Easter Risings and its leaders. It is 
believed that the Easter Risings led to the independence of Ireland and remains the true 
republican example to follow. It is explained that the struggle has since lost its track. To go 
back to the essentials, the same ideology of the Easter Risings’ leaders, like Connolly, should 
be adopted:  
“We have done a re-assessment and analysis of the role and policies of Sinn Fein. 
We have tried to correct past errors and have attempted to push through the anti-
imperialist struggle in the context of the struggle for socialism. We have had our 
successes and we have had our failures, but at all times we have tried to be true to 
Connolly” (Ard Fheis ’72, 1972, p.15-16). 
It can be concluded that British rule and identity is entirely rejected by Sinn Féin, which 
legitimises its struggle towards the independence of Northern Ireland and the unification with 
the Republic of Ireland. Moderation towards the British is not present at all.  
After every discourse analysis, a content analysis of the source can be found (e.g. Table 3). The 
way the content analysis is conducted can be found in the chapter ‘Content Analysis’. The data 
in ‘Total’ shows the total percentage of discourse regarding aspirations of independence 
Northern Ireland. 
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Independence/unification 2,54% 
British imperialism/repression 7,32% 
Other similar struggles 0,17% 
Historical struggle 0,29% 
Irish 14,99% 
Total 25,30% 
Table 3: Content Analysis Presidential speech, Ard Fheis, 15-16 December 1972 
Joe Cahill at rally in Dublin, 1971 
This text is retrieved from a radio broadcast of RTE during the show Current Affairs. It contains 
a speech by Joe Cahill at a Sinn Féin rally in Dublin in 1971. Even though it is not a 1972 
fragment, the topic addressed is very relevant. Additionally, due to the small quantity of 
relevant sources by the illegal organisation PIRA, the fragment is selected as a valuable source 
to this research. Even though Bloody Sunday had not taken place yet, the conflict was heated 
and the British Army was already deployed in Northern Ireland. Joe Cahill was involved in the 
split of the IRA in 1969 and the establishment of the PIRA. In 1971 Cahill was the PIRA 
commander in Belfast (The Guardian, 26/07/2004). 
The strongest discourse can be found on the unification of Ireland. Cahill makes his message 
and the message of the PIRA clear, insisting that the freedom of Northern Ireland and Ireland 
must be achieved: 
“We are quite confident and I am not being overconfident when I say: we have the 
means and the will and the power to achieve freedom and we attend and tend to 
achieve it this time. Our children, your children, my children will grow up as free 
men and free women in a free peace loving Ireland. That is my main message here 
tonight. The struggle that’s going on in the North today is a struggle for complete 
freedom!” (Cahill, 1971). 
Also the aggression of the British government (and the Stormont and Irish governments) is 
brought up:  
“We of the republican movement set ourselves a task. First, the defence of the 
people in the North against any aggression. This we successfully accomplished. 
Then, when the British Army emerged as we expected them to come out in their 
true colors as the aggressive […(unclear)] when they commenced their brutality 
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and their murder of Irish innocent victims, we issued an ultimatum to them, that we 
would retaliate and this thank god we did do and will continue to do” (Cahill, 1971). 
The perceived aggression of the British Army generates a similar hostile reaction from Cahill. 
The PIRA will do anything to remove the aggressive British to protect the Irish people.  
Only the categories on independence and British repression are present in the speech, which 
makes the message discussed earlier even stronger. The message is often repeated and 
explained; Ireland should be united and the British should withdraw.  
Independence/unification 15,95% 
British imperialism/repression 9,23% 
Other similar struggles 0% 
Historical struggle 0% 
Irish 0% 
Total 25,18% 
Table 4: Content Analysis Joe Cahill at rally in Dublin, 1971 
Overall, the discourses of both Sinn Féin and the PIRA create an image of an illegitimate, 
oppressive British ruler in both ‘occupied’ Northern Ireland as the ‘neo-colonial’ Republic of 
Ireland. This creates legitimacy of the other strong message; the goal of independence and 
unification. Irish is used to emphasise the Irish distinctive identity, though this is not present in 
the speech by Cahill. Moderation towards the British is non-existent. The British are the 
occupiers and they need to leave. 
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Discourse analysis 1998 
1998 is the year of the Good Friday Agreement. The relationship between the PIRA and Sinn 
Féin has changed, moving Sinn Féin to the forefront, encouraging the PIRA towards a ceasefire. 
The negotiations that included Sinn Féin started in 1994. Up until March 1995 Sinn Féin had 
only offered proposals for the unification of Ireland, which had not been taken into account. 
Though since, Sinn Féin’s proposals changed and had strong positions on reorganising the 
police force and the release of political prisoners. A setback for the Nationalists was the 
renouncing of the Irish claim to Northern Ireland, which meant that British rule was no longer 
illegitimate according to the Republic of Ireland. Nonetheless, during Sinn Féin’s Ard Fheis of 
1998, 97% voted in favour of the Good Friday Agreement (Tonge, 2002, p.183-185).  
The peace agreement led to various reactions among the Nationalists. Sinn Féin perceived the 
Good Friday Agreement as a step towards unification (Tonge, 2002, p.183-185). Many PIRA 
members adapted to the turn towards a peaceful path, when respected members of the PIRA 
leadership, e.g. Martin McGuinness, were also convinced. It became clear that the PIRA’s 
military actions were hurting Sinn Féin’s political campaign (Moloney, 2002, p.383). The PIRA 
now used violence as leverage to influence the negotiations, for example during the breaking 
of the ceasefire in 1996, when the peace process had been perceived as too slow and not 
inclusive (Berti, 2013, p.157-161).  
Sinn Féin had also changed its strategy by maintaining better relationships with the other parties 
like SDLP and the British government and became more involved with the rest of the 
community. It emphasised its distinctiveness from the PIRA while not criticizing it. The 
perception of how a united Ireland would be achieved changed for both Sinn Féin and the PIRA. 
With the Good Friday Agreement Sinn Féin accepted to enter the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
but would still abstain from Westminster. The PIRA on the other hand refused to decommission 
on the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, but its use of violence declined after the Good 
Friday Agreement (Berti, 2013, p.159-166). 
First Northern Ireland Assembly, 1 July 1998 
The first Northern Ireland Assembly took place shortly after the referendum on 22 May 1998 
and the elections 25 June 1998. Topics discussed are the appointments of the First and Deputy 
First Ministers, the Committee to advise the Presiding Officer and the Orange Order parade. 
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Only the text spoken by Sinn Féin’s Assembly Members are taken into account within the 
context of the parliamentary debate. 
It is interesting that the discourse on independence and illegitimate British rule or repression is 
hardly present. There is a reference by Gerry Adams to the ‘historical aim’, however, it is 
unclear whether this is the unification of Ireland or the aim to create a Northern Ireland that is 
free of discrimination and repression. British and Unionist repression is only mentioned once 
by Martin McGuinness saying:  
“We are here on behalf of people who have been discriminated against since the 
foundation of the Northern state. We are here on behalf of people who want an end 
to inequality, discrimination, domination and injustice” (Northern Ireland 
Assembly, McGuinness, 01/07/1998). 
The absence of a strong discourse on independence or British illegitimate rule indicates 
moderation. Also the acceptance and the reiteration of support of the Good Friday Agreement 
by various Sinn Féin members shows a form of acceptance of the Northern Irish situation. 
Describing this as acceptance of the British rule is an overstatement, but it could be perceived 
as acceptance of the situation as it is:  
“We reiterated our support for the Agreement” (Northern Ireland Assembly, 
Adams, 01/07/1998). 
“the only piece of paper which counts here is the Good Friday Agreement” 
(Northern Ireland Assembly, McGuinness, 01/07/1998). 
However, their Irish distinctiveness is emphasised by the substantial use of the Irish language. 
Almost all Assembly Members of Sinn Féin start their statements in Irish, which they have to 
translate into English for the non-Irish speaking Assembly Members. This way Sinn Féin 
distinguishes themselves and promotes the Irish language and culture:  
“The Irish language has been used by Sinn Fein members for years […] and it will 
continue to be used by them” (Northern Ireland Assembly, Maskey, 01/07/1998).  
The discourse on independence and British imperialism is hardly present, showing some 
moderation brought by the Good Friday Agreement. Though, a connection to the Irish identity 
and a feeling of ‘us and them’ is created by the use of the Irish language. However, the overall 
discourse on independence is not strong.  
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Independence/unification 0,16% 
British imperialism/repression 1,16% 
Other similar struggles 0% 
Historical struggle 0% 
Irish 11,29% 
Total 12,60% 
Table 5: Content Analysis First Northern Ireland Assembly, 1 July 1998 
Presidential Speech, Ard Fheis, 18 April 1998 
The presidential speech is given by Gerry Adams, who was closely involved in the peace talks 
and the establishment of the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement has been signed by the 
leaders involved in the talks on 10 April 1998 and the confirming referendum took place on 22 
May 1998 (BBC History, n.d.). During this Ard Fheis, Sinn Féin discusses amongst each other 
whether and how the Good Friday Agreement fits in their strategy. 
The strongest discourse can be found in the category of independence. The main message 
Adams brings, is that the Good Friday Agreement is part of a transitional process. It is a step 
towards the unification of Ireland:  
“So while the Agreement is not a settlement, it is a basis for advancement. It heralds 
a change in the status quo. And it could become a transitional stage towards 
reunification” (Adams, 18/04/1998). 
“We have our eye on the prize. The prize of freedom” (Adams, 18/04/1998). 
This message is necessary to convince the critics within the party. A strong setback for many 
republicans in the Good Friday Agreement, is the renouncing of the Irish claim over Northern 
Ireland. However Sinn Féin argues that if they achieve political strength, they will be able to 
reach a united Ireland anyway (Adams, 19/04/1998). In the end, British rule over Northern 
Ireland is not accepted by Adams, although this notion is not as strong as it was before:  
“The talks process has not settled centuries of British interference in Ireland. […] 
Britain has never had any right to be in Ireland. Britain will never have any right to 
be in Ireland” (Adams, 18/04/1998). 
The reference to earlier Irish struggles strengthens the discourse on the British illegitimate rule 
and brings inspiration. It is also used as a way of reflection. This fits the context of an address 
concerning a peace treaty, which is a turning point in the struggle: 
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“Two hundred years ago the United Irish Movement rose against British occupation 
of our country. We stand today before the slogan which inspired that Movement. 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. We can draw inspiration and example from the 
men and women of 1798” (Adams, 18/04/1998). 
Not only past clashes with the British government are used to justify the Nationalist aims, but 
also comparisons to other similar struggles. By acknowledging the similar struggle of others, 
comparisons can be made to justify one’s own struggle. This is done by inviting speakers from 
for example the Spanish self-determination movement ETA from the Basque country (UCDP2, 
n.d).  
What is surprising, since Irish is used in most addresses by Sinn Féin to emphasise their Irish 
heritage, is that the Irish language is not spoken at all. This might be symbolic for bringing the 
whole community together, also the non-Irish speakers (Unionists). It might also be perceived 
as moderation towards Britain.  
Other forms of moderation are mainly addressed towards the Unionists in Northern Ireland. It 
is a way to start uniting the people of Northern Ireland and to continue the peace process:  
“Republicans have no wish to discriminate against you; to dominate you; to 
marginalise you; to drive you from this island; to make you second class citizens in 
the land of your birth” (Adams, 18/04/1998). 
Moderation towards the UK cannot be found explicitly. However, the address has a less hostile 
rhetoric, which can be perceived as a minimal form of moderation. This shows the influence of 
the Good Friday Agreement. The speech also shows willingness to use peaceful means to reach 
Sinn Féin’s goal of Irish unification, in which the Good Friday Agreement is a transitional 
phase. The overall discourse on independence is weaker, which can be perceived in the 
percentages in Table 6. 
Independence/unification 5,12% 
British imperialism/repression 3,57% 
Other similar struggles 0,09% 
Historical struggle 0,72% 
Irish 0% 
Total 9,50% 
Table 6: Content Analysis Presidential Speech, Ard Fheis, 18 April 1998 
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Statement PIRA on decommissioning in An Phoblacht, 30 April 1998 
The statement by the PIRA is published in An Phoblacht, the magazine of Sinn Féin, days after 
the signing of the agreement. An issue that has been topic of debate for many years is the 
decommissioning of the PIRA and other paramilitaries. The PIRA has a strong stance in this. 
Even though it claims to be committed to the peace process, decommissioning will happen on 
their own terms.  
The discourse on independence and unification is not as strong as before, even though it is clear 
that a united Ireland is still the goal:  
“We face the future united, committed and dedicated to the struggle for Irish Unity 
and Independence” (P. O’Neill, 30/04/1998). 
However, an observable change is the means through which this goal is targeted. Moderation 
cannot be found concerning the Unionists nor the British, though it can be found towards the 
peace process and Sinn Féin. The PIRA does agree with the new peaceful way and supports 
this, which could be perceived as moderation: 
“We commend the efforts of Sinn Féin. They can be confident of our desire to see 
all republicans engage in their decision-making process at this time in a constructive 
and positive way” (P. O’Neill, 30/04/1998). 
Also, the discourse on imperialism and British repression is present, though not as much as 
before:  
“It remains our position that a durable peace settlement demands the end of British 
rule in Ireland” (P. O’Neill, 30/04/1998). 
It is clear that the PIRA does not accept the British rule and works on its own terms, especially 
regarding decommissioning. The PIRA wants to maintain self-determination in this:  
“This issue [decommissioning], as with any other matter affecting the IRA, its 
functions and objectives, is a matter only for the IRA, to be decided upon and 
pronounced upon by us” (P. O’Neill, 30/04/1998). 
The Irish language is not really present. Though they call themselves ‘Óglaigh na hÉireann’, 
which is mostly translated with regards to the PIRA as ‘Irish Volunteers’. This shows their 
connection to the Irish language and Irish identity. 
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Thus, the discourse on independence is still strong among the PIRA, however, they also show 
commitment to peaceful means through their support of the efforts by Sinn Féin. Though, again, 
independence still remains their goal.  
Independence/unification 7,59% 
British imperialism/repression 2,17% 
Other similar struggles 0% 
Historical struggle 0% 
Irish 0,81% 
Total 10,57% 
Table 7: Content Analysis Statement PIRA on decommissioning in An Phoblacht, 30 April 1998 
Overall, the Good Friday Agreement has resulted in a less powerful and hostile discourse on 
independence among Sinn Féin and the PIRA. Though, the Good Friday Agreement is 
perceived as a transitional phase towards independence, which remains their main goal. Also, 
their commitment to peaceful means is expressed and can also be observed when Sinn Féin 
enters the Northern Ireland Assembly. Interesting is the difference in strength of the discourse 
of Sinn Féin in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the speech at the Ard Fheis. Addressing a 
different public seems to matter.  
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Discourse analysis 2015 
Sinn Féin has become an established political party with policies not only regarding Irish 
unification, but addressing public policy in various areas as well. Even though the unification 
is still Sinn Féin’s goal, it seems like it is not prioritised over everything else (Whiting, 2016, 
p.548). Sinn Féin has 29 seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, making it the second biggest 
party, the biggest Nationalist party and therefore a governing party (BBC, 11/05/2011). The 
party still refuses to enter Westminster Parliament, where they have 4 seats (BBC, 2018). In 
2015 the Fresh Start Agreement was established, which dealt with problems of paramilitaries 
and the welfare reforms. However, the parties to the Agreement were not able to agree on the 
way to deal with the legacies of the Troubles, for example in terms of parades and flags (BBC, 
19/11/2015).  
The PIRA has officially decommissioned in 2005 and stopped existing since. However, 
unofficially there are still splinter groups and remnants of the PIRA which undermine the police 
forces. In 2015, former PIRA members Gerard Davison and Kevin McGuigan were killed, 
allegedly by members of the PIRA. Their deaths caused a political row. However, Sinn Fein 
had a different reaction to the violence than during the Troubles, namely to distance themselves 
from and deny the existence of the PIRA (BBC, 13/08/2015). Punishments (within its 
communities) through shootings or beatings by the PIRA and other former paramilitary groups 
are still present and the groups are often compared to the mafia. The unification of Ireland and 
illegitimate British rule seem unlikely to be the main cause of their existence. Most groups have 
gone into organised crime and most attacks are a form of punishment of ‘antisocial behaviour’ 
(NOS, 22/05/2018). 
Northern Ireland Assembly, 7 September 2015 
The Assembly meeting of 7 September 2015 is chosen deliberately because of its context. 
During the summer recess the murders of Gerard Davison and Kevin McGuigan were 
conducted, which is one of the topics discussed during this meeting. Due to the alleged 
involvement of the PIRA, it is interesting to discuss Sinn Féin’s discourse. Additionally, the 
topic of the Queen as the longest serving monarch is addressed, which could be a sensitive topic 
for Sinn Féin as well. Further agenda points are e.g. the Syrian refugee crisis, improving the 
Northern Irish economy, creating jobs and the childcare strategy.  
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There is no explicit call for a united Ireland at all. However it is mentioned that Sinn Féin is a 
republican party, which is connected to the aim of a united Ireland. It could also be argued that 
Sinn Féin is trying to reach its goal through regular policy:  
“Transport infrastructure is a vital element of the economy across the region, as Mr 
Humphrey mentioned. Máirtín Ó Muilleoir commented on the need […] for 
improved rail links between Dublin and Belfast, highlighting that the Dublin-
Belfast economic corridor is important if we are to achieve a step change in business 
performance across this island. That was very much to the fore about 20 years ago, 
and it needs to be put back on the political agenda” (Northern Ireland Assembly, 
Flanagan, 07/09/2015). 
By implementing (subtle changes to) policy that creates stronger ties between Northern Ireland 
and Ireland, small progress could be made towards a united Ireland. Yet, overall, Sinn Féin 
seems focused on governing Northern Ireland within the framework of devolution.  
When the topic of the PIRA in connection to the murders of Gerard Davison and Kevin 
McGuigan is addressed, Sinn Féin denies PIRA’s existence and claims it will never exist again. 
This is a particularly strong statement. Sinn Féin only wants to reach its goal through peaceful 
means and will not take up arms to reach its goal. This shows acceptance of the situation and 
possibly a reduction in the strength of the aim, since not all means are acceptable anymore: 
“Sinn Féin does not agree with the Chief Constable's assessment that the IRA exists, 
even in the benign way that he states. The IRA left the stage in 2005 and it is not 
coming back” (Northern Ireland Assembly, Kelly, 07/09/2015). 
Additionally, no reference to British illegitimate rule can be found in Sinn Féin’s text. By 
governing and participating in the democratic process and cooperating with the British 
government, it seems like a ‘regular’ party operating under British rule. Interesting to pay extra 
attention to, is the topic of the Queen as the longest-serving monarch. The Speaker wrote a letter 
congratulating her on behalf of the whole Assembly. It is surprising Sinn Féin did not oppose 
to the statement on behalf of the Assembly. This is surprising since previously, Sinn Féin would 
not have recognised the Queen as the legitimate ruler of Northern Ireland and would have 
refused to congratulate her on her ‘illegitimate’ rule. It is still an overstatement to conclude that 
Sinn Féin accepts British rule over Northern Ireland, though they have weakened their 
discourse.  
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The only way in which the earlier struggle or repression of the Nationalists is brought up, is in 
the discussion of the refugee crisis: 
“There is a wonderful four-city initiative on this island, and the Irish people are 
saying, "You are welcome here. Tá fáilte romhaibh anseo. We know what it is like 
to suffer. We know what it is like to have to flee” (Northern Ireland Assembly, 
Ruane, 07/09/2015). 
It is not used in any regard to a united Ireland; it is used to make the refugee situation relatable. 
It is not clear if Ruane is referring to the Troubles and earlier British repression, though it seems 
likely.  
What is notable, is the substantial use of the Irish language. It is mostly used to thank the 
Speaker or the speaking Assembly Member, again emphasising Sinn Féin’s Irishness.  
Overall, Northern Irish independence and British imperialism are not mentioned, though Sinn 
Féin might be trying to create stronger ties with Ireland through policies. This connection with 
Ireland is further strengthened by the use of the Irish language. However, no explicit references 
to independence are made, showing a weak discourse. It might even show a form of acceptance 
of Northern Ireland under devolution.  
Independence/unification 0,38% 
British imperialism/repression 0,02% 
Other similar struggles 0% 
Historical struggle 0,14% 
Irish 1,34% 
Total 1,88% 
Table 8: Content Analysis Northern Ireland Assembly, 7 September 2015 
Presidential speech, Ard Fheis, 7 March 2015 
When Adams addresses his party, he mentions the topic of a united Ireland, but the main focus 
of the address is on the financial cuts imposed by the British government and the Eurozone. In 
2015 financial cuts have been announced by Westminster, which are not well received by 
especially Nationalist parties (The Guardian, 26/05/2015). Interesting is that the unification of 
Ireland is not addressed through the illegitimate rule of the British, but through policies: 
“Many people now realise that it makes no sense to have two economies, two 
education systems, two health systems, two tax codes, two currencies on one small 
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island. The sense of one island, one Ireland can work for everyone. I believe we 
need a national conversation on all of this. A conversation about the future” 
(Adams, 07/03/2015). 
Other references to a united Ireland can be found in more subtle wording. For example referring 
to the whole island of Ireland as ‘Ireland’ or talking about an ‘island wide campaign’. The party 
behaves like Ireland and Northern Ireland are already united.  
However, the discourse on independence is much weaker than in earlier addresses. Also, the 
topic of British illegitimate rule is not addressed at all, which could point to a more accepting 
stance by Sinn Féin regarding British rule. Also, some moderation can be found regarding the 
Unionists in Northern Ireland: 
“We need reminded again and again that our flag is Orange. Orange as well as 
green. Orange is part of what we are. That is our potential. And our challenge. To 
unite Orange and Green in equality and mutual respect” (Adams, 07/03/2015). 
On the other hand, some references are made to historical struggles, but mostly in a 
commemorative way:  
“Dealing with the past is very difficult. Yesterday was the anniversary of the 
Gibraltar killings. Today is Sam Marshall’s anniversary. Every day marks an 
anniversary for someone, for some family, for some community” (Adams, 
07/03/2015). 
Also references are made to other similar struggles. Some ambassadors of other countries with 
similar struggles are invited, again ambassadors from the Basque country. Interesting to note is 
the following explicit request: 
“Tonight, I call on the Irish government to act on the Sinn Féin motion adopted 
unanimously by the Dáil and to recognise the state of Palestine” (Adams, 
07/03/2015). 
This is not only mentioned because of the Palestinian struggle for territory, but because of the 
British involvement in Palestine. Sinn Féin is of the opinion that the cases in Palestine and 
Northern Ireland are both the result of British imperialism. The question could be raised as a 
result of the recognition of Palestine: if Palestine is recognised as a state, why would Northern 
Ireland not be recognised? Therefore, it strengthens and justifies the struggle of Sinn Féin.  
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As opposed to the presidential address of 1998, Irish is often used in short phrases creating a 
connection to the Irish identity. Also reference is made to the Irish Language Act to promote 
the Irish language. 
As mentioned before, the independence of Northern Ireland is addressed mainly through 
policies. However, much attention is given to policies other than independence. This shows a 
weaker discourse, especially with the absence of discourse on illegitimate British rule. Though 
again, the Irish language is promoted and shows connectedness to the Irish identity. 
Independence/unification 4,05% 
British imperialism/repression 0,18% 
Other similar struggles 0,33% 
Historical struggle 3,50% 
Irish 8,28% 
Total 16,34% 
Table 9: Content Analysis Presidential speech, Ard Fheis, 7 March 2015 
Eamonn Mallie meets… Martin McGuinness, 2015 
Martin McGuinness is a former member of the PIRA (second in command in Derry), had a 
strong role in the peace process and was Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland as a member 
of Sinn Féin in 2015. Even though McGuinness might not seem like the most representative 
former PIRA member as Deputy First Minister, he has used violent means during the Troubles 
under the PIRA and made a transformation into the use of peaceful means like most former 
members. Therefore, this interview is chosen for the analysis. 
Martin McGuinness made no reference to a united Ireland. He played an important role in the 
peace process and had a prominent role in the Northern Ireland Assembly. He chose his words 
carefully during the interview and did not want to create any disturbance in society. Yet, it is 
remarkable for a member of Sinn Féin and a former PIRA member to not mention 
independence. Additionally, the Irish language and Irish distinctiveness is not referred to at all. 
References to British illegitimate rule and repression are made when discussing why 
McGuinness became a member of the PIRA. He was born in Derry, Northern Ireland, a place 
that posed strong opposition in the fight against the British:  
“Well this was during the course of the Battle of the Bogside and effectively the 
entire Bogside area where I came from was at war with the RUC and with those 
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who were involved in enforcing the inequalities and discriminations that people 
were being subjected to” (McGuinness, 2015). 
“The city was effectively occupied by the British Army. The forces of the state, the 
B-Specials, the RUC, huge violence was being used against the community, 
innocent people were being shot dead” (McGuinness, 2015).  
This discourse does not portray McGuinness’ 2015 opinion necessarily; it explains his vision 
in the 1970s when he joined the PIRA. Recent references are not made. In similar fashion, 
references are made to historical events like Bloody Sunday and the Battle of the Bogside. This 
is not used in a commemorative way to fire up the discussion or to find justification for the 
current struggle, but to explain McGuinness’ reasons to join the PIRA.  
Again, the absence of discourse on the aim for a united Ireland and on the current British 
illegitimate rule, might point into a direction of acceptance. Concluding that an acceptance of 
the British rule is present would be an exaggeration, but it could be perceived as an acceptance 
of the current Northern Irish situation. Moderation can also be found in McGuinness’ relation 
toward the Unionist community: 
“[…] some of the strongest friends that I have throughout what has been a very 
difficult process, come from the Protestant churches, come from the Protestant 
community” (McGuinness, 2015). 
Independence/unification 0% 
British imperialism/repression 3,36% 
Other similar struggles 0% 
Historical struggle 0,42% 
Irish 0% 
Total 3,78% 
Table 10: Content Analysis Eamonn Mallie meets… Martin McGuinness, 2015 
Taking the three 2015 sources into account, one can observe a decrease in the strength of 
discourse on independence within Sinn Féin and the PIRA. It is not absent, but reduced to a 
minimal level. Sinn Féin might use its position as a governing party to implement policies that 
strengthen the ties between Northern Ireland and Ireland, however, few explicit references are 
made to a united Ireland. Though the Ard Fheis still has stronger discourse on independence 
than Sinn Féin in the Northern Ireland Assembly, the presidential speech at the Ard Fheis has 
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also become more concerned with national policy. Interesting is the interview with the former 
PIRA member, which shows a strong contrast with the earlier used PIRA sources. It shows that 
the PIRA as a group aiming for independence through violence has stopped existing.  
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Content analysis 
The sources used for the content analysis are newspaper articles from the Irish Times. These 
articles are not chosen at random. The newspaper articles are retrieved from the Irish Times 
archive, which maintains online copies of old newspapers. Sinn Féin affiliated search terms 
were used to search articles that contained mostly Sinn Féin’s discourse. After this selection 
was made, articles with a discourse on independence were chosen. When these were non-
existent, this could indicate the decrease in the aspirations and an article on an affiliated topic 
would be chosen. Since the articles had to be counted by hand and the content analysis had to 
be done by hand, the scope was restricted. Therefore, every year in the timeframe of 1972-2015 
was divided in three sections, resulting in the selection of the months January, May and 
September. As it was rare that all three months contained a suiting article, it was decided to 
search for two articles each year in two of the three months. Though, future research should be 
conducted with a larger scope trying to find a source for every month for every year. Another 
remark is that the Irish Times is not objective. The editors and journalists made a decision in 
what was printed and what not, which influences the research and is acknowledged. Future 
research would require the use of sources like Sinn Féin manifestos and party programmes. 
However, to get a hand on this was also beyond the scope of the research.  
The overall result was 82 sources to be used in the content analysis. For the year 1982 no suiting 
articles were found. For 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980 and 1983 only one article was found. This is 
mainly caused by censorship. The categories used are similar to the categories used for the 
discourse analysis. The categories are counted separately, but their overall percentage is shown 
in graph 1 below.  
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When looking at the graph and the trend displayed, it is clear that the discourse on independence 
has decreased over the years. The trend even shows a diagonal downward line. It is interesting 
that the discourse strongly decreased when the official peace talks began in 1990’s and Sinn 
Féin wanted to be included. However, 1998 shows a peak. Sinn Féin probably tries to convince 
its followers here, that independence is still its goal. 
In the years after the peace agreement some newspaper articles show a percentage of zero or 
near to zero, in which Sinn Féin discusses other policies than independence. However, the 
fluctuation also shows that the discourse on independence is not absent. Though looking solely 
at the trend, one would argue that from the peace talks on, the discourse on independence of 
Sinn Féin (displayed in the Irish Times) decreased and continued to decrease in the long term.   
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Conclusion 
To answer the research question: “does territorial power sharing, as the outcome of an ethnic 
conflict, lead to decreasing aspirations of independence among self-determination movements 
over time?” a discourse analysis and content analyses have been conducted on the aspirations 
of independence of Sinn Féin and the PIRA in Northern Ireland. It has been argued by some 
(Coronel Ferrer, 2012; Kymlicka, 1998; Bertrand, 2014) that TPS will not lead to decreasing 
aspirations in the long term. 
When taking the discourse analysis and content analysis into account, it is clear that the 
discourse on independence of Sinn Féin and the PIRA have decrease since the peace talks in 
the 1990’s, indicating a decrease in aspirations of independence. The content analysis shows a 
downward linear trend, indicating that the decrease in the discourse on independence is a 
continuing process. However, this is more nuanced when the meaning of the discourse is taken 
into account in the discourse analysis. Even though the PIRA has stopped existing, Sinn Féin 
seems to be focussing on a long-term strategy for independence and unification with Ireland. 
This seems to be related to Cornell’s argument, where Sinn Féin is using politics and policy 
changes to reach their goal, for example through the Language Act, infrastructure, currency and 
connecting the economies on the island. They are gaining political strength necessary to achieve 
a referendum on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. This strategy is implicitly 
mentioned in the Ard Fheis and implemented in the Northern Ireland Assembly meetings, 
resulting in a discrepancy in the discourses in the Assembly and the presidential speeches.  
However, the Good Friday Agreement and the peace talks have created a difference in the 
discourse on independence of Sinn Féin and the PIRA. Though the content analysis shows a 
strong decrease, it also shows that the aspirations are still present. The Good Friday Agreement 
has especially made a difference in the means, following the arguments by Lijphart and Cohen. 
The self-determination movements are now able to use legal and democratic channels, instead 
of violence, to bring about change.  
Hypothesis 1 is accepted; TPS (in Northern Ireland) leads to decreasing aspirations of 
independence in the short term. Hypothesis 2 is, however, more ambiguous. Though the content 
analysis shows a continuously decreasing trend, it seems like Sinn Féin has a long-term plan 
for independence and unification in the discourse analysis. 
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Therefore, further research should be conducted over a longer period of time to see the process 
more clearly. Also, more cases should be researched to be able to make a more general and 
theoretical conclusion. Further research could especially be relevant for governments wanting 
to maintain their territorial borders and peace. Taking this research into account, TPS might not 
be helpful to maintain one’s territory in the long-term. Additionally, the resurrection of the 
question of independence might be destabilising the peace. This is especially the case in 
Northern Ireland, with aggressive splinter paramilitary groups still present and not one 
generation passed. A resurrection of the independence question and possibly a referendum 
would be able to cause an increase in violence. If it can be concluded that an increase in 
aspirations of independence is the long-term effect of TPS, more research should be done to 
find ways to prevent this. Overall, TPS has a positive short term effect and moves the (violent) 
struggle of independence to legal and democratic institutions. 
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